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Reflections on the Path of Religion-State
Relations in New Zealand
Rex J. Ahdar∗
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, religious controversy has caught most New Zealanders
rather unprepared. New Zealand earned the ire of some Islamic
nations when two of its major city newspapers reprinted the Danish
cartoons depicting the Prophet Mohammed.1 That was followed by
an outcry over the screening of an episode of South Park, the
American satirical television cartoon show, which showed a statue of
the Virgin Mary menstruating.2 The Prime Minister, Helen Clark,
denounced the screening of the episode as “quite revolting.”3 She
insisted, “I think the critical thing is we show respect for other
people’s beliefs.”4
In New Zealand, public consternation and debate over religious
matters is unusual, for religion seldom appears to occupy a
prominent place in the lives of most of its citizens. In one sense, this
may be viewed as a positive thing; for New Zealand, by and large,
has not witnessed the large-scale and bitter religious turmoil that has
beset many nations. This is, of course, a broad generalization, and it
would be remiss to ignore, for example, the spasms of fierce sectarian
feuding between the transplanted Protestant and Catholic
communities in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that
punctuated this seemingly serene religious landscape.5 Furthermore,
∗ Faculty of Law, University of Otago, New Zealand.
1. See T. Hume, Trade Officials on Alert After Media Show Mohammed Cartoons,
SUNDAY STAR-TIMES, Feb. 5, 2006, at A1.
2. See M. Young & E. Kiong, TV Chief Rejects Bishops’ Boycott Call over ‘Tasteless’
Cartoon, N.Z. HERALD, Feb. 20, 2006.
3. See A. Young, South Park’s ‘Mary’ Episode Revolting, Says PM, N.Z. HERALD, Feb.
21, 2006.
4. Id.
5. See, e.g., RORY SWEETMAN, BISHOP IN THE DOCK: THE SEDITION TRIAL OF JAMES
LISTON (1997) (recounting the unsuccessful prosecution of a Roman Catholic bishop for
sedition in 1922); G.A. Wood, Church and State in the Furthest Reach of Western Christianity,
in CHRISTIANITY, MODERNITY AND CULTURE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON NEW ZEALAND
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various emergent public expressions of religiosity by the indigenous
people (the Maori) have been vigorously and swiftly suppressed by
the state.6 Nonetheless, the general picture, I suggest, is one of
comparative tranquility; at least in comparative global terms. As
professor John Stenhouse notes, “what is striking about New
Zealand’s past is not that bigotry existed but that it so seldom
erupted into violence. By world standards, New Zealanders handled
their religious differences remarkably well.”7 The explanations for
this fortunate turn of events are undoubtedly diverse and complex. It
may be that the comparative absence of religious tension, violence,
and rancor is simply due to New Zealand’s relatively short history as
a modern nation state.
Perhaps the comparative calm reflects a somewhat benign
indifference and coolness toward organized religion in general by
sizeable segments of the population. Certainly, that has been the
predominant view of many New Zealand historians who, guided by
implicit assumptions of the steady march of secularization, depicted
religion slowly receding into irrelevance.8 As Sir Keith Sinclair—
perhaps the leading post-World War II New Zealand historian—
dryly observed, “The prevailing religion is a simple materialism. The
pursuit of wealth and possessions fills more minds than thoughts of
salvation.”9 Similarly, sociologist Michael Hill stated that
[d]espite some early attempts to transplant various Christian
denominations to New Zealand on a regional basis—the Church of
England in Canterbury, the Free Church of Scotland in Otago,
vestiges of which can still be found in regional patterns of religious
adherence—no denomination managed to establish claims to
monopoly, and from the mid-nineteenth century there was an
acceptance of pluralism and a secular stance on the part of the
state. . . . While a majority of the population adopted some form of

HISTORY 207, 229–332 (John Stenhouse ed., 2005); P.S. O’Connor, Sectarian Conflict in
New Zealand, 1911–1920, 19 POL. SCI. 3 (1967).
6. For example, the Tohunga Suppression Act 1907 made it a criminal offence for
tohunga (an expert, priest, or healer) to practice on the “superstition and credulity” of Maoris
or to profess to possess supernatural healing powers. See Malcolm Voyce, Maori Healers in
New Zealand: The Tohunga Suppression Act 1907, 60 OCEANIA 99 (1989).
7. John Stenhouse, God’s Own Silence: Secular Nationalism, Christianity and the
Writing of New Zealand History, 38 N.Z. J. HIST. 52, 68 (2004).
8. See id.
9. KEITH SINCLAIR, A HISTORY OF NEW ZEALAND 261 (1961).
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denominational label, nominalism was evident in the considerably
lower proportions who engaged in regular religious activity.10

However, this received historical view of religion may well be
misleading. The downplaying of the importance of religion in
ordinary New Zealanders’ lives, and in the shaping of society, may
owe much to a prior commitment by scholars to see the nation forge
an enlightened, secular, left-liberal path.11 This Article briefly
traverses the evolution of religion-state relations in New Zealand.
Part II will summarize roughly the first century of this evolution.
This Article argues that the de jure stance of non-establishment,
religious equality, and pragmatic secularism was also marked by a de
facto or cultural establishment of a generic, yet heavily Protestantinfluenced, Christianity. Part III outlines some key trends in the
latter half of the twentieth century. First, there has been a steady
erosion of the de facto Christian establishment and a concomitant
acceleration of the secularization of public institutions and social life.
Yet, secondly, there has been a counter-thrust to this secularization
in the official recognition of Maori spiritual concerns as part of a
broader program recognizing the historic obligations owed to the
Maori people by the government. Finally, increased immigration
from Asia and Africa has contributed to a steady growth of the
Muslim, Hindu, and other non-Christian faith communities. When
viewed together, these trends illustrate that the challenges posed by
this growth in religious pluralism pose some urgent and difficult
questions for New Zealand policy makers, human-rights agencies,
and courts. Part IV concludes with speculation as to how the future
religion-state landscape in New Zealand will continue to evolve.
II. THE PAST
A. Pluralistic Roots, Religious Equality, and Secularism
Three interrelated themes mark the foundational period of
official New Zealand religion-state relations: pluralistic roots, an
ongoing commitment to religious equality, and a pragmatic
secularism.

10. Hill, Religion, in NEW ZEALAND SOCIETY: A SOCIOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION 295
(Paul Spoonley et al. eds., 2d ed. 1994).
11. See Stenhouse, supra note 7, at 58.
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1. Pluralistic roots
First, New Zealand has never had an established church.12 As the
Supreme Court clarified at the turn of the twentieth century, “There
is no State Church here. The Anglican Church in New Zealand is in
no sense a State Church. . . . and, although no doubt it has a very
large membership, it stands legally on no higher ground than any
other of the religious denominations in New Zealand.”13
There were various early regional attempts at religious
establishment by the European immigrants. The Free Church of
Scotland founded settlements in both Otago and Southland. The
Otago settlement was begun in 1848 by the Reverend Thomas
Burns and Captain William Cargill, both of whom were “fervent
Free Churchmen” and who “saw themselves as making a godly
experiment after the model of the Pilgrim Fathers two centuries
earlier.”14 Unfortunately for them, their dream of a Free Church
theocracy, a “Geneva of the Antipodes,” was to founder.15
Canterbury, led by John Robert Godley, was to be “a new-world
exemplar of an Anglican state.”16 Again, these early settlers never
realized their hopes. Further attempts include a Roman Catholic
stronghold on the West Coast of the South Island, the fledging
Nonconformist settlement in Albertland in Northland, and the small
Scandinavian Lutheran settlements in places such as Dannevirke.17
This history of numerous attempts to establish religious colonies
supports the argument that what the Europeans brought was not a
homogeneous thing called Christianity.18 Instead, the migrants saw
themselves very much in denominational terms, as first Anglicans,
Presbyterians, Methodists, Catholics, and so on. New Zealand was
12. See J. HIGHT & H.D. BAMFORD, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND LAW OF
NEW ZEALAND 378 (1914).
13. Carrigan v. Redwood, [1910] 30 N.Z.L.R. 244, 252. The Court of Appeal affirmed
this in 1998. See Mabon v. Conference of the Methodist Church of New Zealand, [1998] 3
N.Z.L.R. 513, 523 (“Unlike England and Scotland, New Zealand does not have a national
established church.”).
14. HUGH R. JACKSON, CHURCHES AND PEOPLE IN AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND
1860–1930, at 17 (1987).
15. ALLAN K. DAVIDSON, CHRISTIANITY IN AOTEAROA: A HISTORY OF CHURCH AND
SOCIETY IN NEW ZEALAND 34 (3d ed. 2004).
16. JACKSON, supra note 14, at 17.
17. See DAVIDSON, supra note 15, at 54–55; JACKSON, supra note 14, at 17–18.
18. LLOYD GEERING, 2100: A FAITH ODYSSEY—THE CHANGING FACE OF NEW
ZEALAND RELIGION 8 (1995).
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less of a unified Christian nation and more of “a Christian
archipelago—a collection of denominational islands, each with its
own shared set of beliefs.”19
There was a modest initial preference for the Anglican Church,20
leading some to describe that Church as having a quasiestablishment role in the colony. But as scholar Antony Wood
observed, “The Anglican Church’s pre-eminence was a shadowy
affair in comparison with its position in the home country or in older
established colonies of settlement.”21 New Zealand was settled as a
British colony at the time when the principle of non-establishment
was gaining favor in Britain and the disestablishment of the Church
of England was being seriously debated.22 It was also the period
when the remaining legal disabilities upon Roman Catholics,
Nonconformists, and Jews were being repealed in Britain.23 The
settlement of New Zealand reflected these changing philosophies
and gave no official preference to any particular religion.
This pattern of pluralistic settlement played a significant role in
nineteenth-century New Zealand’s formal separation of church and
state. The Freethinkers of the 1880s did not need to mount a
constitutional campaign for the separation of church and state as
“the two were relatively separate” already.24
2. An ongoing commitment to religious equality
A second theme has been an ongoing commitment to religious
equality. We can trace this back to the Treaty of Waitangi 1840, a
founding document whereby the leaders of the indigenous
inhabitants, the Maori people, ceded sovereignty to the British
Crown in return for becoming British subjects and securing the
continued protection of their lands.25 The New Zealand Court of
19. Id. at 13; see also Lloyd Geering, Pluralism and the Future of Religion in New
Zealand, in RELIGION IN NEW ZEALAND SOCIETY 218 (Brian Colless & Peter Donovan eds.,
2d ed. 1985).
20. For examples of this preference, see G.A. Wood, Church and State in New Zealand
in the 1850s, 8 J. RELIGIOUS HIST. 255 (1975).
21. Id. at 267.
22. Peter Lineham, Freethinkers in Nineteenth-Century New Zealand, 19 N.Z. J. HIST.
61, 71 (1985).
23. Wood, supra note 5, at 213–14.
24. Lineham, supra note 22, at 76.
25. The treaty is reproduced in full in the First Schedule of the Treaty of Waitangi Act
1975, 1975 N.Z.T.S. No. 114. The precise meaning and significance of the Treaty is a subject
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Appeal described the Treaty of Waitangi as “a solemn compact
between two identified parties, the Crown and the Maori, through
which the colonisation of New Zealand was to become possible . . .
[and which] requires each party to act reasonably and in good faith
towards the other.”26
The signing of the Treaty of Waitangi on February 6, 1840,
unexpectedly included an oral assurance of religious freedom and
equality to the Maori people. This came about due to the initiative
of the Roman Catholic bishop, Bishop Jean Baptiste Francois
Pompallier.27 In response to Pompallier’s request for protection of
the Catholic Church by the British Government, Governor William
Hobson, “with much blandness of gesture and expression,” replied,
“Most certainly,” and proceeded to express his regret that the bishop
had not made known his wishes earlier, as the provision “would have
been embodied in the treaty.”28 The Reverend Henry Williams, the
person charged with translating the agreement into the Maori
language, wrote, “The Governor wishes you to understand that all
the Maoris who shall join the Church of England, who shall join the
Wesleyans, who shall join the Pikopo or Church of Rome, and those
who retain their Maori practices, shall have the protection of the
British Government.”29 The note was relayed to the Governor, who
in turn passed it on to Pompallier, who read it and expressed
approval. Williams then read a carefully written statement to the
Maori assembly:
E mea ana te Kawana, ko nga whakapono katoa, o Ingarani, o nga
Weteriana, o Roma, me te ritenga Maori hoki, e tiakina ngatahitia e
ia. (“The Governor says the several faiths [beliefs] of England, of

generating much controversy in contemporary New Zealand. The Maori understanding,
buttressed by the official Maori language version of the Treaty, is that something less than full
sovereignty (kawanatanga or “governorship”) was ceded to the British and thus full authority
(rangatiratanga) remained with them. See, e.g., JAMES BELICH, MAKING PEOPLES: A HISTORY
OF THE NEW ZEALANDERS 193–96 (1996); see also PHILIP JOSEPH, CONSTITUTIONAL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN NEW ZEALAND 42–95 (2d ed. 2001).
26. New Zealand Maori Council v. Attorney General, [1987] 1 N.Z.L.R. 641, 673
(C.A.).
27. J.B.F. POMPALLIER, EARLY HISTORY OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN OCEANIA 63
(1888).
28. T. LINDSAY BUICK, THE TREATY OF WAITANGI: HOW NEW ZEALAND BECAME A
BRITISH COLONY 152 (3d ed. 1936); see also HUGH CARLETON, THE LIFE OF HENRY
WILLIAMS 314 (rev. ed. 1948).
29. BUICK, supra note 28, at 153; CARLETON, supra note 28, at 315.
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the Wesleyans, of Rome, and also the Maori custom, shall be alike
protected by him.”)30

Despite skepticism, this verbal assurance has taken on a renewed
importance in the latter part of the twentieth century, sometimes
being referred to—alongside the three written articles—as the
“Fourth Article” of the Treaty.31 Although its legal validity has been
questioned,32 the promise does evidence an early commitment to
religious equality, even if only nominally.
The earliest Parliamentary debates are also indicative of this
desire for religious equality. An unexpected debate occurred at the
opening session of Parliament on May 26, 1854, about whether
there should be an opening prayer.33 James Macandrew, a
Presbyterian MP (Member of Parliament) from Dunedin, offered to
fetch a nearby Anglican parish minister to ensure there would be “an
acknowledgement of dependence on the Divine Being.” It was
“clear to [Macandrew] that the House of Representatives, being the
first embodiment of a New Zealand nationality, should be

30. WILLIAM COLENSO, THE AUTHENTIC AND GENUINE HISTORY OF THE SIGNING OF
TREATY OF WAITANGI 32 (1890). However, there were some that questioned the motives
of the assurance and deemed the assurance nominal at best. Claudia Orange argues that the
English missionaries hoped that the Roman Catholic faith would suffer by association with
ritenga (what James Busby, the first British official stationed in New Zealand, termed “heathen
practices”), which they attacked as decadent and which they wished to eliminate. She adds,
The official recognition seemingly given Maori custom should be seen for what it
was—an inclusion arising from sectarian jealousy. It ran counter to nineteenthcentury Christian sensitivities, and barely accorded with Normanby’s instructions to
suppress, by force if necessary, the more extreme Maori usages. This promise to
protect Maori custom—a verbal commitment given only by chance—amounted to
very little.
CLAUDIA ORANGE, THE TREATY OF WAITANGI 53 (1987).
31. See, e.g., NEW ZEALAND LAW COMMISSION, MAORI CUSTOM AND VALUES IN NEW
ZEALAND LAW 72–74 (Study Paper 9, March 1, 2001), available at
http://www.lawcom.govt.nz/ProjectStudyPapers.aspx?ProjectID=112; E.T. Durie, Will the
Settlers Settle? Cultural Conciliation and the Law, 8 OTAGO L. REV. 449, 460 (1996).
32. This contemporary characterization of Governor Hobson’s promise as being equal
to the written provisions is misleading. The better view is that the promise was intended to
have moral and not legal weight. See MICHAEL KING, THE PENGUIN HISTORY OF NEW
ZEALAND 163 (2003) (“The assumption that it might be used to enforce state protection and
encouragement of Maori religious practices—‘ritenga maori,’ in Williams’s translation—is
misplaced.”).
33. See Allan K. Davidson, Chaplain to the Nation or Prophet at the Gate? The Role of the
Church in New Zealand Society, in CHRISTIANITY, MODERNITY AND CULTURE: NEW
PERSPECTIVES ON NEW ZEALAND HISTORY 311, 312–14 (John Stenhouse ed., 2005); Wood,
supra note 20, at 255.

THE
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consecrated,” and so he proposed a motion to that effect.34 Dr.
Walter Lee, MP, immediately raised a counter-motion that the
House “be not converted into a conventicle, and that prayers be not
offered up.”35 A vigorous debate ensued. Some considered that such
a prayer would seem “to involve the question of a State religion, the
very appearance of which ought to be avoided” by the House.36
Edward Gibbon Wakefield, MP, tried to assuage fears by pointing
out that in America, “where State religion was absolutely
repudiated,” the practice of opening the legislative houses with
prayer was allowed.37 Some members were by now becoming
impatient and sought to short-circuit potentially “fruitlessly
prolonged” discussion, so Frederic Weld, MP, suggested an
amendment: “That this House, whilst fully recognizing the
importance of religious observances, will not commit itself to any act
which may tend to subvert that perfect religious equality that is
recognized by our Constitution, and therefore cannot consistently
open this House with public prayer.”38
Wakefield, MP, worried that “New Zealand should be singular in
this respect among the Christian countries of the earth”39 if
proceedings began without a prayer. Dr. Walter Lee, MP, responded
with doubts as to how the Jew could join with the Christian in a
prayer and added, “[A]s the Constitution had very properly rid them
of State religion, the House should take care how they voluntarily
submitted to it.”40 Weld’s amendment was rejected by twenty votes
to ten.41 The House then returned to the original motion and passed
it (with no vote count recorded):
That, in proceeding to carry out the resolution of the House to
open its proceedings with prayer, the House distinctly asserts the
privilege of a perfect political equality in all religious denominations,
and that, whoever may be called upon to perform this duty for the
House, it is not thereby intended to confer or admit any pre-

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
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eminence to that Church or religious body to which he may
belong.42

The Reverend F.J. Lloyd was introduced, read prayers, and never
appeared again, the prayer being given thereafter by the Speaker of
the House. That same first Parliament, on August 28, 1855, also
rejected a salary of £600 for Anglican bishop George Selwyn.43 While
“recognizing the zeal and energy” of the bishop and the “valuable
services” rendered by him to the colony, the House could not vote a
salary to him “without departing from the principle of perfect
equality of all religious denominations—a principle which [the]
House [had] already affirmed and to which the maintenance of
which it [stood] pledged.”44
3. Pragmatic secularism
A third theme can be characterized as pragmatic secularism. This
is a secular stance born of a practical desire to avoid religious friction,
as opposed to an ideological animosity toward institutional religion.
One example of this pragmatic secularism can be found in the
history surrounding the Education Act of 1877. Education has often
been a major battlefield for church-state conflict, and New Zealand
was no exception. The churches began their own schools at first.
Abolition of the provinces in 1876 gave rise to the need for a
national policy of education and a clarification of the roles of church
and state. The debate on education in the late 1870s was conducted
“against the background of increasing sectarian tension.”45 The
passage of the Education Act of 1877 is an important and fascinating
story that has been well documented by historians.46 It established a
national system of education that was to be free, secular, and
compulsory. The famous “secular clause” read, “The school shall be
kept open five days in each week for at least four hours, two of which

42. Id. (emphasis added).
43. See Wood, supra note 20, at 264–65.
44. Id. at 512 (Mr. Forsaith being the speaker).
45. DAVIDSON, supra note 15, at 65.
46. See, e.g., IAN BREWARD, GODLESS SCHOOLS? A STUDY OF PROTESTANT REACTIONS
TO THE EDUCATION ACT OF 1877 (1967); DAVIDSON, supra note 15, ch. 7; JOHN MACKEY,
THE MAKING OF A STATE EDUCATION SYSTEM: THE PASSING OF THE NEW ENGLAND
EDUCATION ACT, 1877 (1967).
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in the forenoon and two in the afternoon shall be consecutive, and
teaching shall be entirely of a secular character.”47
In addition to including a “secular clause,” the House of
Representatives deleted from the Education Bill the provision for
religious exercises. The Legislative Council attempted to resurrect
the provision but failed. Scholars emphasize that the secularity of the
national education program was not primarily an anti-religious
sentiment or advocacy of secularism, but rather was an attempt to
defuse sectarian strife.48 Ian Breward, in the major work on this
subject, observed,
Careful study of the debates and divisions shows that there was very
little doctrinaire secularism amongst members. Although [some]
members of the Legislative Council . . . signed a protest against the
secular provisions of the act, others saw parliament’s action as a
necessary way of distinguishing the sacred from the secular, or at
the very least as a practical political solution to the educational
tensions caused by denominationalism.49

Another example of this pragmatic secularism can be found in
Doyle v. Whitehead, a 1917 case.50 In Doyle, Sir Robert Stout, Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, made a rare judicial statement
pronouncing New Zealand to be a secular state. The Wellington City
Council passed a bylaw prohibiting playing golf on Sundays in Town
Belt Reserves.51 Following a complaint from the Ministers’
Association and clergymen of the Presbyterian Church—apparently
concerned with the bad example to the youth at the adjacent
Presbyterian orphanage—the respondent, who breached this bylaw,
was charged. A Magistrate acquitted him on the grounds that the
bylaw was made for no other reason than to enforce Sunday
observance and was thus invalid in terms of the relevant legislation.
The Supreme Court unanimously upheld this finding. Chief Justice
Stout declared,
Considering that the State is neutral in religion, is secular, and that
the State has provided for Sunday observance only so far as
prohibiting work in public or in shops, &c, is concerned, and not

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
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Education Act 1877, § 84(2) (emphasis added).
DAVIDSON, supra note 15, at 65; GEERING, supra note 18, at 10.
BREWARD, supra note 46, at 18.
[1917] N.Z.L.R. 308, 314 (S.C.).
Id. at 309.
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prohibiting games, it cannot be said that this by-law is a reasonable
by-law. It has also to be borne in mind that recreation on Sunday is
not an offence even in countries where the Christian religion is
established by law.52

Thus, an examination of history reveals both legislative and
judicial policy that reflects a practical compromise in avoiding and
resolving religion-based controversies. This pragmatic secularism,
alongside New Zealand’s pluralistic roots and commitment to
religious equality, formed a distinct backdrop to the de facto
establishment of Christianity.
B. A Concurrent Trend: A De Facto or Cultural
Christian Establishment
While New Zealand may not have had a legally established
church or religion, a solid case can be made that there was a de facto
or cultural establishment of a generic Christianity.53 Ivanica
Vodanovich, for instance, has argued that “the New Zealand model
. . . combine[d] separation of church and state, with recognition of
the state as ‘Christian,’” and that the state was committed to a “nonspecific and non-sectarian” Christianity.54 James Belich similarly has
discerned a “vague, shared Protestantism” as loosely binding the
nation.55 This mirrors the view of some American commentators
that, despite the formal separation of church and state in the United
States, there was a de facto establishment of a nondenominational
pan-Protestantism for the first 200 years or so.56 In Philip
Wogaman’s words, the United States experienced a kind of social or
cultural establishment of Protestantism that was “like the wallpaper
of a room—very much in evidence but scarcely noticed.”57
52. Id. at 314.
53. The argument was first advanced by this author in Rex Ahdar, A Christian State?,
13 J.L. & RELIGION 453 (1998–99).
54. Ivanica Vodanovich, Religion and Legitimation in New Zealand: Redefining the
Relationship Between Church and State, 3 BRIT. REV. N.Z. STUD. 52, 52 (1990).
55. BELICH, supra note 25, at 439. Belich applied this characterization to the Pakeha
(European) population, but it could be extended to entire populations, Maori included.
56. See James Davison Hunter, Religious Freedom and the Challenge of Modern
Pluralism, in ARTICLES OF FAITH, ARTICLES OF PEACE 55, 71 (James D. Hunter & Os
Guinness eds., 1990). See also JOSÉ CASANOVA, PUBLIC RELIGIONS IN THE MODERN WORLD
135–66 (1994), for an excellent discussion of the decline of the Protestant “cultural
hegemony” in America in the late twentieth century.
57. PHILIP WOGAMAN, PROTESTANT FAITH AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 194 (1967)
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The de facto Christian establishment was manifested in many
ways. The laws and institutions in New Zealand naturally reflected
Christian values given the religious composition of the population.58
Moreover, the governing elite were predominantly Christian.59 While
public education was ostensibly secular, schools permitted
religious—specifically Protestant—teaching on a limited basis under
what came to be known as the “Nelson system.” This ingenious
scheme, commenced in 1897, was the brainchild of Nelson
clergyman Reverend J.H. McKenzie. It was argued that because
schools were open for five hours a day—three in the morning and
two in the afternoon—a school might declare either the first or last
hour of the morning as one designated for voluntary religious
instruction. This was possible under the Education Act of 1877,
which allowed school buildings to be used on days and at hours other
than those used for public school purposes. Supporters of religious
education realized that this enabled religious instruction as well as
the statutory minimum of four hours of secular education to take
place within the customary school hours.
The legislation currently in force—the Education Act of 1964—
repeats the secular clause,60 simply formalizing this long-standing
arrangement.61 Section 78 authorizes the technical “closure” of a
school for up to one hour per week to allow religious instructors to
give instruction or for religious observances to be conducted during
school hours in a manner approved by the board of that school. Such
instruction has to be undertaken by voluntary instructors, not
teachers, but may take place within school buildings. Section 78A
allows “additional religious instruction” if the majority of parents of
pupils at a school desire and if the instruction does not detract from
the normal curriculum. Under section 79, parents have the right to
withdraw their children from any such religious instruction or
observances if they so wish.62
(quoting Martin E. Marty).
58. For example, according to the 1896 Census figures, some ninety-four percent of the
population were Christian. Anglicans were the largest denomination (at forty percent). See
Wood, supra note 5, at 208 n.4.
59. See id. at 226–27.
60. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
61. Education Act, 1964 § 77, available at http://www.legislation.govt.nz/libraries/
contents/om_isapi.dll?clientID=82169&infobase=pal_statutes.nfo&jump=a1964135&soft
page=DOC.
62. See generally BREWARD, supra note 46, at 37–46; Colin McGeorge, On the Origins
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Others have observed the de facto establishment of Christianity.
Sir Ivor Richardson, a former President of the Court of Appeal,
concluded his comprehensive 1962 survey of the religious dimension
of New Zealand laws by rejecting the view that Christianity was part
of New Zealand law or that New Zealand was a Christian state. As
he put it, “[i]f this means that the doctrines and principles of
Christianity are legally binding on all citizens or that the political
apparatus of government is subject to the mandates of the Christian
religion, then the statement is patently incorrect.”63 However, he
continued,
Nevertheless there is a certain amount of truth in the statement
that Christianity is part of our law. In the first place, the Christian
religion has played an important part in shaping our culture, our
tradition, and our law. As Lord Sumner pointed out in Bowman v.
Secular Society Ltd. [1917] A.C. 406, 464-465, the family is built
on Christian ideals, and Christian ethics have made a tremendous
impact on the development of our law, as is only natural
considering that the majority of New Zealanders come from a
Christian background.64

New Zealand has its own instances of what some American
scholars have dubbed “ceremonial deism,”65 a term that refers to a
“class of public activity . . . accepted as so conventional and
uncontroversial as to be constitutional.”66 The symbolic or
ceremonial examples of Christianity’s special position in New
Zealand society67 include:
• The opening prayer is said by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives.68
of the Nelson System of Religious Education, in GODLY SCHOOLS? SOME APPROACHES TO
CHRISTIAN EDUCATION IN NEW ZEALAND 1, 1–16 (Bryan Gilling ed., 1993).
63. I.L.M. RICHARDSON, RELIGION AND THE LAW 61 (1962).
64. Id.
65. The United States Supreme Court has used this term on occasion. See, e.g., County
of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 595 (1989); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 716
(1984); Steven B. Epstein, Rethinking the Constitutionality of Ceremonial Deism, 96 COLUM.
L. REV. 2083 (1996).
66. Epstein, supra note 65, at 2091 (quoting Arthur E. Sutherland, Book Review, 40
IND. L.J. 83, 86 (1964) (reviewing WILBER G. KATZ, RELIGION AND AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONS (1963))).
67. See generally Wood, supra note 5, at 210–12.
68. Standing Orders require the prayer to be said. The wording of the current prayer
was settled in 1962 but is not written into the Standing Orders nor is it regarded as binding on
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• Official oaths are sworn on the Bible (but affirmation is
available also).69
• Public holidays include religious occasions such as Christmas
Day, Good Friday, and Easter Monday.70
• The monarch, Elizabeth the Second, is “by the grace of God”
the Queen of New Zealand, and one of her titles is Fidei
Defensor, the “Defender of the Faith.”71
• The national anthem is a hymn entitled “God Defend New
Zealand.”72
• Blasphemous libel is a criminal offense.73
The foregoing examples stand in stark contrast to New Zealand’s
official non-establishment and are found in various forms throughout
the county’s history. They reflect an unofficial, yet firm
establishment of Christianity in official State affairs. But despite the
prominence of de facto Christianity, this unofficial establishment has
begun to erode, as will be described in Part III.
Part II has illustrated how New Zealand’s history of church-state
relations has been heavily influenced by the counterpoint between
official secularism and a de facto Christian establishment. These two
factors have continued to evolve concurrently, creating the unique
the Speaker. It reads:
Almighty God, humbly acknowledging our need for Thy guidance in all things, and
laying aside all private and personal interests, we beseech Thee to grant that we may
conduct the affairs of this House and of our country to the glory of Thy holy name,
the maintenance of true religion and justice, the honour of the Queen, and the
public welfare, peace, and tranquility of New Zealand, through Jesus Christ our
Lord. Amen.
DAVID MCGEE, PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE IN NEW ZEALAND 92 (1st ed. 1985).
69. See Oaths and Declarations Act 1957, § 3 (oath on the Bible, New Testament or
Old Testament) and § 4 (right to make an affirmation instead of an oath). The Oaths
Modernization Bill 2005 is currently before the House of Representatives. Its principal aim is
to modernize and standardize the texts of certain oaths. It does not abolish Biblical oaths in §
3.
70. See Holidays Act 2003, § 44(1).
71. See Royal Titles Act 1974, § 2.
72. See Allan K Davidson, Christianity and National Identity: The Role of the Churches in
‘the Construction of Nationhood,’ in THE FUTURE OF CHRISTIANITY: HISTORICAL,
SOCIOLOGICAL, POLITICAL AND THEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES FROM NEW ZEALAND 16, 27
(John Stenhouse et al. eds., 2004) (The word “God” appears eleven times in the five verses of
Thomas Bracken’s hymn.).
73. Crimes Act 1961, § 123. A prosecution needs the leave of the Attorney-General. Id.
§ 123(4). The only prosecution (unsuccessful) in New Zealand under the section was R v.
Glover, [1922] G.L.R. 185.
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situation that now stands. Part III will briefly describe how these
trends have evolved into New Zealand’s present state of church-state
relations, and how this situation is affected by the New Zealand Bill
of Rights Act (NZBORA).
III. THE PRESENT: EROSION OF THE DE FACTO
CHRISTIAN ESTABLISHMENT
A. Cultural Disestablishment and the NZBORA
The unquestioned reflection of the Christian ethic and a diffuse
Christianity continued until about the 1960s.74 This decade might be
described as the beginning of the erosion of the cultural or de facto
establishment of Christianity.75 There has been a gradual but
unmistakable disestablishment or wresting of generic Christianity
from its position of cultural ascendancy. Today, looking back, some
Christian commentators believe there was an important change, even
a “paradigm shift,”76 in the 1960s. This decade, they believe, saw the
beginning of New Zealand as a “post-Christian” society.77 The
Reverend Bruce Patrick articulated this sense of loss:
74. See Vodanovich, supra note 54, at 52.
75. Interestingly, José Casanova argues that the United States has experienced “three
consecutive processes of disestablishment.” CASANOVA, supra note 56, at 135. The first
constitutional process gave rise to the First Amendment. The second process, he argues, was
the secularization of higher education beginning last century following the Civil War. Id. at
137. The “third disestablishment” is the “disestablishment of the Protestant ethic and the
emergence of a legally protected pluralistic system of norms in the public sphere of American
civil society.” Id. at 155.
76. See Murray Robertson, New Zealand as a Mission Field: The Paradigm Shift, in THE
VISION NEW ZEALAND CONGRESS 46 (Bruce Patrick ed., 1993). Robertson wrote:
I believe God wants us to see that a nation that has been nominally
Christian since its founding is now a post-Christian society, and we are
engaged in a mission. . . . It has happened over the last 30 years. . . . A
shift has occurred. There have been long-term trends, huge subterranean
movements within Western culture . . . in the church we haven’t grasped
what has happened, and by and large we are still operating with the kind
of mentality we had prior to the 1960s.
Id.
77. Bishop Brian Carrell argued that the 1960s was “to be the decade in which the form
of Christianity identified with European nations for over 1300 years, and with their former
colonies such as New Zealand for more than a century, began to go into rapid decline. This
decade would in fact witness the demise of Christendom, arguably a more obvious end in this
country than in any other Western nation.” Brian Carrell, New Culture, New Challenge, in
NEW VISION NEW ZEALAND 49 (Bruce Patrick ed., 1993).
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For many years, as long as Christendom prevailed across the
Western world, the Church was comfortable in a New Zealand in
which a Christian worldview largely prevailed. Since the 1960s
however there has been a steady shift to a secular, now postmodern worldview, and the Church is seen as marginalized.78

The various Christian observances and practices historically
protected in New Zealand law are continually being challenged.
Some have been overturned, while others face a precarious future.
The Speaker’s prayer in Parliament remains intact, but criticisms are
regularly voiced, such as those of one Member of Parliament who in
2003 complained that the prayer “is no longer appropriate for the
Parliament of a diverse and multicultural nation.”79 Sunday
observance by the commercial sector is a thing of the past, with shop
trading on Sundays allowed for all retailers.80 Restrictions on the sale
of liquor on Sundays took longer to be repealed, but such sales are
now also permitted.81 The Easter weekend shop trading ban still
prevails, but defiant shop openings at Easter may test the remaining
bans on trading on these Christian festive days as well.82 Bills to
repeal these remaining restrictions continue to come before
Parliament, although none has yet succeeded.83
A potentially powerful force in accelerating the erosion of de
facto Christianity in New Zealand is the New Zealand Bill of Rights
Act of 1990 (NZBORA).84 If an anti-establishment style, freedom
from religion interpretation of the NZBORA’s freedom of religion
provisions is adopted, then any remaining Christian-based practices
will likely be eliminated. The NZBORA marks a significant new era
in New Zealand constitutional history. It protects the usual civil and

78. Bruce Patrick, After the 1997 Congress, in THE VISION NEW ZEALAND CONGRESS
1997, 32–33 (Bruce Patrick ed., 1997).
79. Letter from Matt Robson, Progressive Party MP, to Jonathan Hunt, Speaker of the
New Zealand House of Representatives (May 6, 2003) (quoted in Davidson, supra note 33, at
314).
80. The Shop Trading Hours Act Repeal Act 1990 repealed the former Sunday (and
Saturday) restriction found in the Shop Trading Act 1977, § 11(1).
81. Freedom to sell liquor on Sundays was effected by the Sale of Liquor Amendment
Act 1999.
82. See, e.g., D. Jamieson, Wanaka Retailer To Fight Charge over Trading on Easter
Sunday, PRESS (Christchurch), Oct. 18, 2005.
83. See, e.g., the Shop Trading Hours (Easter Trading Local Exemption) Bill 2004 (No.
168-1), sponsored by Doug Wollerton MP.
84. 1990, Act No. 109.
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political rights such as rights to vote and to not be subjected to
torture; it guarantees freedom of expression, religion, peaceful
assembly, and association; and it upholds prohibitions on
unreasonable search and seizure, as well as due process requirements
such as the right to a fair trial.85 The Act applies only to the actions
of the government and to persons exercising public functions.86
Regarding religious freedom, the NZBORA contains four
provisions of direct relevance.87 First, section 13—Freedom of
Thought, Conscience, and Religion—provides that “Everyone has
the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion, and belief,
including the right to adopt and to hold opinions without
interference.”88 Section 15—Religion and Belief—addresses the
outward, social expression of such belief: “Every person has the right
to manifest that person’s religion or belief in worship, observance,
practice or teaching, either individually or in community with others,
and either in public or in private.”89 Section 20—Rights of
Minorities—provides protection for religious and other minorities:
“A person who belongs to an ethnic, religious, or linguistic minority
in New Zealand shall not be denied the right, in community with
other members of that minority, to enjoy the culture, to profess and
practise the religion, or to use the language, of that minority.”90
Finally, section 19(1) states, “Everyone has the right to freedom
from discrimination on the grounds of discrimination in the Human
Rights Act 1993.”91 Section 21(1) of the Human Rights Act sets out
thirteen prohibited grounds of discrimination, including: “(c)
Religious belief; [and] (d) Ethical belief, which means the lack of a
religious belief, whether in respect of a particular religion or religions

85. See generally ANDREW BUTLER & PETRA BUTLER, THE NEW ZEALAND BILL OF
RIGHTS ACT: A COMMENTARY (2005); PAUL RISHWORTH ET AL., THE NEW ZEALAND BILL
OF RIGHTS (2003).
86. New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, § 3, available at http://www.oefre.unibe.
ch/law/icl/nz01000_.html.
87. For excellent reviews of the religious freedom protections in the NZBORA, see
BUTLER & BUTLER, supra note 85, at 399–437, and RISHWORTH ET AL., supra note 85, at
277–307.
88. New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, available at http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/
law/icl/nz01000_.html.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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or all religions.”92 Thus, the NZBORA clearly prohibits state
discrimination based on a person’s religion or lack of religion.
It is important to note that the NZBORA is not a supreme-law
type Bill of Rights as with the United States Constitution93 or
Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1982.94 It expressly denies
the courts the power to invalidate legislation that violates the
NZBORA’s fundamental rights and freedoms. Section 4 makes clear
that
[n]o court shall, in relation to any enactment (whether passed or
made before or after the commencement of this Bill of Rights),—
(a) Hold any provision of the enactment to be impliedly
repealed or revoked, or to be in any way invalid or ineffective;
or
(b) Decline to apply any provision of the enactment—
by reason only that the provision is inconsistent with any provision
of this Bill of Rights.95

Despite this limitation on judicial review, courts do have a duty
under section 6 to ensure that statutory provisions are to be given a
meaning that is consistent with the rights enumerated in the
NZBORA. Section 5—Justified limitations—sets out the litmus test
for the restriction of rights generally: “Subject to section 4 of this
Bill of Rights, the rights and freedoms contained in this Bill of
Rights may be subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by
law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic
society.”96
The NZBORA was recently tested in Department of Labour v.
Books and Toys (Wanaka) Ltd.,97 a case involving religious holiday
trade restrictions. The defendant, Wanaka Paper Plus, was a
bookshop in the popular South Island tourist resort, Wanaka. On
Easter Sunday 2004, it decided to open for trading in direct
contravention of section 3(1)(b) of the Shop Trading Hours Act

92. Human Rights Act 1993, § 21(1).
93. U.S. CONST. amends. 1–10.
94. Part I of the Constitution Act 1982, Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), ch.
11. § 2.
95. New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, § 4, available at http://www.oefre.unibe.
ch/law/icl/nz01000_.html.
96. Id. § 5.
97. (2005) 7 H.R.N.Z. 931 (D.C.).
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Repeal Act of 1990.98 This provision requires shops to be closed on
Good Friday, Easter Sunday, Christmas Day, and ANZAC Day
morning.99 The defendant pleaded guilty, and despite the potential
maximum penalty of a NZ$1000 fine, the District Court ordered
that the conviction be discharged without any financial penalty. A
major contributing factor to this leniency was, as the court noted,
the “anomalous”100 nature of the trading ban since certain other
nearby shops (some selling the very same items as the defendant’s)
had been allowed to trade on the day in question by virtue of their
being located in a designated tourist area exempted from the trading
ban. Wanaka Paper Plus, however, was just outside this narrow zone.
The interest in the case lies in the submission that the Easter
trading ban was an unreasonable limitation on the defendant’s right
of religious freedom under sections 13 and 15 of the NZBORA. The
defendant invoked the Canadian Supreme Court case101 R v. Big M
Drug Mart Ltd.102 to argue that if one is precluded from doing an
everyday activity (working, shopping, playing sports) to preserve the
religious sensibilities of others, a form of coercion is arguably
occurring. One is being indirectly forced to observe a religious

98. 1990 No. 57.
99. ANZAC Day (Australian and New Zealand Army Corps Day) is a solemn
commemoration marking the sacrifice of Australian and New Zealand military veterans who
served in overseas wars. See Australian War Memorial, The Anzac Day Tradition,
http://www.awm.gov.au/commemoration/anzac/anzac_tradition.htm.
100. Books and Toys, ¶ 26[c].
101. Canadian cases are not binding on New Zealand courts, but Canadian Supreme
Court decisions on the meaning and scope of the Charter are highly influential because the
NZBORA was modeled, in part, on the Canadian Charter.
102. [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295. The Canadian Supreme Court there held that the Lord’s Day
Act was inconsistent with the guarantee of freedom of religion in section 2(a) of the Canadian
Charter. Id.; see Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act
1982, ch. 11, § 2 (U.K.). The court came to this conclusion despite the Canadian section
being worded purely in free exercise terms. The absence of anti-establishment wording did not
prevent the court from striking down the legislation on a freedom from religion type
interpretation. Indirect religious coercion was present. According to the court, a law which
prohibited Sunday trading worked “a form of coercion inimical to the spirit of the Charter and
the dignity of all non-Christians. In proclaiming the standards of the Christian faith, the
[Lord’s Day] Act creates a climate hostile to, and gives the appearance of discrimination
against, non-Christian Canadians.” [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295. Non-Christians—whether Jews,
agnostics, atheists, or Muslims—were not required or compelled to observe the Christian
Sabbath in the sense that they were compelled to attend Church or pray that day. But they
were required to “remember the Lord’s day of the Christians and keep it holy” insofar as they
were “prohibited for religious reasons from carrying out activities which are otherwise lawful,
moral and normal.” Id.
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practice—a practice which is not of one’s choosing and which may
directly offend one’s own conscience. The “arm of the State”103
ought not to do this, and the New Zealand District Court agreed.
Although, as noted earlier, the New Zealand courts have no
power to declare invalid or ineffective any legislation that is
inconsistent with the NZBORA, courts have discovered the power to
issue indications of inconsistency.104 In Books & Toys, Judge Noel
Walsh declined to issue an indication of inconsistency. As a judge of
the District Court, the lowest court in the New Zealand hierarchy,
he considered he did not have the jurisdiction to make such a
declaration. To question the Shop Trading Act would, he cautioned,
be unwise and “would have the potential to undermine public
confidence in [his] role as a District Court judge, and in the
judiciary’s independence from the political process.”105 He added
that even if he did have jurisdiction, he would have refused to make
the declaration sought here. The genuineness of the defendant’s
religious liberty claim was doubted: “in reality [Wanaka Paper Plus]
opened on Easter Sunday purely for economic reasons, and not on
the basis that the 1990 Act infringed any of the rights guaranteed by
the NZBORA.”106 Although Books and Toys failed to overturn the
trading ban or even secure an indication of inconsistency, it arguably
laid the foundation for later applicants to succeed in obtaining an
indication. Once an indication of inconsistency is signaled,
Parliament may well decide to abolish the Christian-based trading
restrictions.
A relatively recent example of the scope of the NZBORA
involved artistic depiction of religious figures, a controversy
demonstrating that the crime of blasphemy is now all but a dead
letter. In March of 1998, the Museum of New Zealand, Te Papa, ran
a controversial exhibition containing two works highly offensive to
many Christians. The exhibition included the Virgin in a Condom
103. Id.
104. See Andrew S. Butler, Judicial Indications of Inconsistency—A New Weapon in
BORA Armoury?, 2000 N.Z. L. REV. 43 (2000). These declarations, originating from a 2002
Court of Appeal decision, Moonen v. Film and Literature Board of Review, [2000] 2 N.Z.L.R.
9, are firm judicial pronouncements that legislation is in violation of fundamental rights and,
although the enactment in question must still be enforced and cannot be nullified, its
continued existence calls for the attention and remedial work of Parliament. For further
discussion, see RISHWORTH ET AL., supra note 85, at 833–937.
105. Books and Toys, ¶ 24.
106. Id. ¶ 25.
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statue (a 7.5 cm statue of the Virgin Mary clad in a contraceptive)
and a contemporary version of Leonardo da Vinci’s The Last Supper
with a topless woman at the centre of the table in place of Christ.
Notwithstanding Catholic (and other religious) protests—and even
an attack on the statue—the museum refused to withdraw the
exhibits.107 Senior museum officials argued that in a pluralist society
where the museum acted as “a forum within a varied social and
cultural mix,” the chances of one cultural or social group being
offended was “a daily risk” and censorship would simply be
inappropriate.108 Compared to what Christians perceive as the
unquestioned acceptance of religious ideas in the era of cultural
ascendancy, this appears to be, and is experienced as, a downgrading
of religion, a marginalization. An application to invoke the longdisused criminal prohibition against blasphemous libel was rejected
by the Solicitor General. Such a prosecution, he said, would be
inconsistent with the NZBORA’s protection of freedom of
expression in section 14.109 A similar attempt to invoke the
blasphemous liberal ban was launched by a Catholic priest over the
controversial South Park episode of the Virgin Mary, mentioned in
the introduction to this article.110 Permission is unlikely to be
granted by the Solicitor General for the same reason that was given
regarding the Te Papa exhibit.
A powerful example of the NZBORA’s potential impact on New
Zealand’s church-state relations came in a 2005 debate that erupted
in a weekly lunchtime religious club that held meetings at a

107. See Violent and Personal Threats to Museum Staff over ‘Virgin,’ OTAGO DAILY
TIMES, Mar. 10, 1998, at 2; Virgin Statue on Show Despite Attack, SUNDAY STAR-TIMES, Mar.
8, 1998, at A2; Virgin Statue Stays—Protests Ignored, SUNDAY STAR-TIMES, Mar. 15, 1998, at
A1. The statue was by British artist Tania Kovats, while the painting, entitled Wrecked, was by
Sam Taylor Woods; both works appearing in the exhibition Pictura Britannica. For a detailed
discussion of this controversy, see Reid Mortensen, Art, Expression and the Offended Believer,
in LAW AND RELIGION 181–198 (Rex Ahdar ed., 2000).
108. Museum Refuses To Remove Exhibit, OTAGO DAILY TIMES, Mar. 9, 1998, at 2;
Virgin Statue on Show Despite Attack, SUNDAY STAR-TIMES, Mar. 8, 1998, at A2.
109. See No Prosecution over Exhibits, OTAGO DAILY TIMES, Mar. 28, 1998, at 35.
National Party MP, John Banks, and Fr P Denzil Meuli had sought permission to prosecute
under § 123 of the Crimes Act. Solicitor General John McGrath refused the Crown’s consent
saying the principle of freedom of expression was the main factor against allowing prosecutions
to proceed.
110. See supra note 3 and accompanying text; see also ‘Southpark’ Action, OTAGO DAILY
TIMES, Mar. 4, 2006, at 4.
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Wellington state primary school.111 Although this incident did not
see the removal of a religious practice, it sets the scene for future
dismantling of similar religious exercises in public schools. The board
of trustees of Seatoun School banned the weekly “KidsKlub”
meeting, a Christian club established in 2002 and attended by nearly
a third of the school’s four hundred pupils.112 The board pointed to
its obligation under the Education Act of 1964 to “deliver a secular
education,” and it had “chosen to maintain a level of consistency by
operating in the same manner outside of teaching hours, while the
school [was] open.”113 The board’s legal advisers, Chapman Tripp, a
major New Zealand law firm, backed its position.
KidsKlub is based on a Scripture Union program, and similar
groups are held in eighteen other primary schools throughout the
country. The club meetings—involving Bible stories, craft activities,
dances, and songs—were voluntary, held during the school’s lunchbreak, and taught by trained volunteer parents and grandparents.
Children who wanted to attend needed the permission of their
parents to do so.
A group of parents, stung by the incoming board’s ban, sought a
legal opinion from Sir Geoffrey Palmer, a former attorney general
and prime minister and the principal architect of the NZBORA. In
his written opinion, Palmer concluded that the ban breached the
Act’s religious freedom guarantee. Pupils who did not wish to
participate in KidsKlub were free to decline, and there was no
evidence of any compulsion or peer pressure exerted on children
who did not wish to go. However, as for the religious rights of those
pupils who wished to attend, the ban presented a case of clear
infringement. As noted earlier, section 5 of the NZBORA provides
that rights and freedoms may be subject “only to such reasonable
limits prescribed by law and demonstrably justified in a free and
democratic society.”114 The Education Act did not proscribe

111. See BUTLER & BUTLER, supra note 85, at 399, 423–24.
112. See S. Dye, School Split over Religion Club Ban, N.Z. HERALD, June 10, 2005,
at A9, available at http://www.nzherald.co.nz/topic/story.cfm?c_id=133&ObjectID
=10329910.
113. G. Palmer & R. Opie, “Freedom of Religion and the Board’s Decision to Prevent
the Ongoing Operation of Kidsklub at Seatoun School,” Opinion by Chen, Palmer &
Partners, ¶ 11 (May 24, 2005) (on file with author).
114. New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, § 5, available at http://www.oefre.unibe.
ch/law/icl/nz01000_.html.
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voluntary religious programs at schools. Just the opposite—voluntary
religious programs were expressly permitted. KidsKlub was in accord
with the statutory scheme. The reasonableness of the ban is what was
suspect here. It was difficult to see how those who did not wish to
attend had experienced any curtailment of their rights. Furthermore,
children who wished to attend had to have parental consent. In
other words, they had to positively “opt-in.” This was a different
situation from those where religious instruction or observances were
a built-in part of the school program and those not wishing to
participate had to positively “opt-out.”115
The Seatoun School controversy was raised in Parliament. The
minister of education, Trevor Mallard, was reluctant to become
embroiled in the debate, simply responding that school boards were
autonomous bodies: “I do not back the decision but I back the
board’s right to make it.”116 After reconsidering the matter, and
perhaps dismayed by the adverse publicity, the board eventually
resolved to reinstitute the KidsKlub meetings.117
The Seatoun School case did not involve the more traditional
and prevalent form of religious instruction programs run at state
primary schools; namely, those run during school hours (not
lunchtimes) where the presumption is that children will attend unless
their parents take active steps to excuse them. For example, the
longstanding “Bible in Schools” program operates in about 60
percent of state primary schools with some four thousand volunteer
instructors and about 5 percent of pupils opting out in their
respective schools.118 New Zealand courts may follow the Canadian
courts119 and similarly rule that such Bible in Schools programs are
violations of the non-participating children’s religious freedom. The
Nelson system of voluntary religious instruction in state primary

115. In some nations, courts have invalidated such opt-out programs on the basis that the
requirement on non-participating pupils to withdraw meant the pupils incurred stigma and
concomitant peer pressure to conform, and hence their religious freedom was impinged. See,
e.g., Zylberberg v. Sudbury Bd. of Educ., [1988] 52 D.L.R. (4th) 577 (Ont. C.A.); see also
REX AHDAR & IAN LEIGH, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN THE LIBERAL STATE 240 (2005).
116. New Zealand Parliamentary Debates, June 21, 2005, at 21757.
117. School Gives Way on Lunchtime Bible Study, DOMINION POST (Wellington), July 7,
2005, at A1.
118. Anna Saunders, On a Legal Opinion and a Prayer: The Religious Divide, DOMINION
POST (Wellington), June 28, 2005, at A8.
119. See supra note 101.
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schools preserved by the Education Act of 1964120 has not yet been
directly challenged, but there exists a climate sympathetic to its
abolition.
B. Erosion of De Facto Establishment in Other Contexts
Aside from the impact of the NZBORA, erosion of the de facto
establishment of Christianity has taken place in other contexts. One
example is in the Queen’s title. Queen Elizabeth II may still be the
“Defender of the Faith,” but explicit acknowledgment of the
Christian faith while in her presence was recently deemed
inappropriate in her outermost former colony. In February 2002, the
Prime Minister, Helen Clark, came under attack for her decision to
cancel the saying of grace at the Commonwealth Heads of
Government banquet attended by Queen Elizabeth and other
dignitaries. She defended, “[t]here was no grace for the same reason
as there is none now in New Zealand, because we’re not only a
society of many faiths, but we’re also increasingly secular. In order to
be inclusive, it seems to me to be better not to have one faith put
first.”121
By way of a broader and admittedly impressionistic sweep, we
can identify the cultural disestablishment of Christianity by
considering the changed moral and religious underpinnings reflected
in various contemporary laws, particularly those dealing with social
morality, broadly defined. Prior to the latter part of the twentieth
century, various laws in the social, domestic, and family arena
implicitly reflected Christian values, or perhaps one should say
“traditional,” “biblical,” or “conservative” Christian mores.
For example, until the closing decades of the twentieth century,
New Zealanders viewed marriage as a lifelong union of two members
of the opposite sex. Divorce was difficult to obtain, as were
abortions, and homosexual relations between males were subject to
criminal sanction. Prostitution was unlawful, as was euthanasia. Time
and venue restrictions applied to both liquor sales and gambling
outlets.
The laws governing these areas now show a declining Christian
imprint. Heated public debate over these issues is a visible expression
of the so-called “culture wars” that are being waged here, as in other
120. See supra Part III.A.
121. Lack of Grace Leaves No Trace, OTAGO DAILY TIMES, Mar. 9, 2002, at A7.
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Western nations.122 The emergence of small, struggling Christian
political parties since the late 1980s—espousing conservative moral
policies and emphasizing “family values”—is another manifestation
of these contests over the vision of the good society.123
Marriage is still a union between a man and a woman,124 but
there is pressure to change the legal definition of marriage to legalize
marriage of same-sex couples. The government, in an effort to meet
these concerns, passed the Civil Union Act of 2004,125 which allows
same-sex couples (and opposite-sex de facto couples living together
in a long-term marriage-like relationship) to enter into “civil unions”
with all the usual rights, privileges, and duties of marriage, albeit
without the right to describe themselves as married.126 The civil
union legislation aroused much controversy with the Catholic
bishops of New Zealand, criticizing it for its potential to “erode the
‘special and unique position’ of marriage and the family.”127 More
strident was the noisy march upon Parliament organized by the
Destiny Church, a Pentecostal church whose 5000-strong blackshirted male protesters chanted, “enough is enough” in reference to
what the Church maintained was a severe decline in moral
standards.128
There are examples of cultural disestablishment in a number of
other contexts as well. In the 1980s, no-fault “dissolution” replaced
divorce with the enactment of the Family Proceedings Act of

122. For an account of the New Zealand kulturkampf from the perspective of
conservative Christians, see REX J. AHDAR, WORLDS COLLIDING: CONSERVATIVE CHRISTIANS
AND THE LAW (2001).
123. See generally Jonathan Boston, Christian Political Parties and MMP, in GOD AND
GOVERNMENT: THE NEW ZEALAND EXPERIENCE (Rex Ahdar & John Stenhouse eds., 2000);
Wood, supra note 5, at 234–35.
124. This was confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Quilter v. Attorney General, [1998] 1
N.Z.L.R. 523 (C.A.), where the court upheld the refusal to grant marriage licenses to a lesbian
couple.
125. Act. No. 102.
126. The Relationships (Statutory References) Act 2005, 2005 S.N.Z. No. 3, designed to
accompany the Civil Union Act, ensures that the same legal rights and duties enjoyed by
married couples extend to same sex or opposite sex de facto couples who have formalized their
relationship in a civil union.
127. Late Bids by Church, MP to Block Civil Union Bill, OTAGO DAILY TIMES, Dec. 6,
2004, at 3.
128. Five Thousand Protest Against Civil Unions Bill, N.Z. HERALD, Aug. 23, 2004. The
Destiny march drew some fierce criticism, some likening it to a fascist demonstration. See
March Compared to Rise of Nazism, OTAGO DAILY TIMES, Aug. 24, 2004, at 3.
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1980.129 Abortions are now more readily obtained if the rising
annual statistics are a reliable indicator.130 Since 1986, sexual
relations between adults of the same sex are no longer a criminal
offense.131 Decriminalization of homosexuality was a highly
controversial issue132 galvanizing conservative Christians to enter the
political fray in much the way that Roe v. Wade,133 the abortion case,
proved a catalyst for American evangelicals to engage more actively
in the political process.134 Homosexuality, or more accurately “sexual
orientation,” is also a prohibited ground for discrimination along
with the traditional grounds (race, religion, sex, nationality, and so
on) under the Human Rights Act of 1993.135
Decriminalization of prostitution and the regulation of the sex
services industry in the interests of public health resulted from the
passing of the Prostitution Reform Act of 2003.136 Interestingly, the
stated purpose of the Act was “to decriminalise prostitution (while
not endorsing or morally sanctioning prostitution or its use).”137
However, for opponents of this measure (and the others being
discussed currently), the legalization of activities that previously
carried a firm moral stigma could not avoid sending a message of
state endorsement.
Finally, the gaming laws have been liberalized and new forms of
gambling—casinos, Lotto, poker machines, and sports betting—have
proliferated. Decriminalization of marijuana is a serious subject for
debate,138 as is the legalization of a restricted form of euthanasia.139
129. Family Proceeding Act of 1990, 1980 S.N.Z. No. 94.
130. In 2003 there were 18,511 abortions performed in New Zealand. In 1996 there
were 14,805 abortions performed, whereas in 1990 there were 11,173 abortions. See REPORT
OF THE ABORTION SUPERVISORY COMMITTEE (2004).
131. See Homosexual Law Reform Act 1986, 1986 S.N.Z. No.33.
132. See LAURIE GUY, WORLDS IN COLLISION: THE GAY DEBATE IN NEW ZEALAND,
1960–1986 (2002); see also AHDAR, supra note 122, at 221.
133. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
134. See e.g., STEPHEN CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: HOW AMERICAN LAW
AND POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 58 (1993) (explaining that “Roe was like a
cold shower” in terms of its awakening effect upon religious conservatives).
135. See Human Rights Act 1993 § 21(1)(m). “Sexual orientation” means “a
heterosexual, homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation.” Id.
136. Prostitution Reform Act of 2003, 2003 S.N.Z. No. 28.
137. Id. at § 3.
138. See, e.g., Kevin Dawkins, Cannabis Prohibition: Taking Stock of the Evidence, 10
OTAGO L. REV. 39 (2001).
139. The latest unsuccessful attempt at introducing a form of voluntary euthanasia was
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These examples serve to illustrate that the NZBORA, combined
with other statutory and cultural changes, have furthered the erosion
of de facto Christianity happening since the 1960s. Cultural
secularism is gradually displacing the de facto Christianity of the past
and conforming government practice to the theory of official
secularism. Offsetting this trend, however, is a counter-thrust of
multicultural recognition.
C. Emergence of a More Heterogeneous, Multicultural Society
The erosion of a de facto establishment is being met with a
strong movement toward active acknowledgement of Maori
spirituality and a similar movement toward recognizing other
minority religions. This section will describe many examples of how
New Zealand’s indigenous population has asserted its spirituality,
how that assertion has been acknowledged by mainstream culture,
and finally, how Islamic activists have asserted their religion in official
church-state relations, all leading to a more multicultural society.
1. Official state endorsement of indigenous (Maori) spirituality140
As the cultural disestablishment of Christianity accelerates, the
appearance of a more genuine secular state has been belatedly
thwarted by a recognition and adoption of a resurgent traditional
Maori spirituality. This represents a stark reversal of government
policy; historically, New Zealand governments were decidedly
unsympathetic to Maori religion. The Tohunga Suppression Act of
1907 is a well-known example. With that Act, the Government
sought to curb the activities of Maori traditional healers, or tohunga,
by making the practice of their medicinal arts a criminal offence.141
Official government support for Maori and their spiritual
concerns might be traced to the state’s belated desire to honor its
obligations under the Treaty of Waitangi. Or perhaps, Maori culture
and spirituality are just a particularly suitable focus in a climate made
up of such diverse ideological streams as post-modernism, anti-

the Death with Dignity Bill 2003, No. 37-1, introduced by New Zealand First MP, Peter
Brown.
140. For a detailed treatment, see Rex Ahdar, Indigenous Spiritual Concerns and the
Secular State: Some New Zealand Developments, 23 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 611 (2003).
141. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. This Act was eventually repealed by the
Maori Community Development Act 1962, No. 133, § 44.
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colonialism, post-colonial guilt feelings, and fascination with New
Age values.142 “Indigenous belief systems,” suggested one journalist,
“carry a romantic dimension that appeals enormously to the starved
middle-class inner life in this secular technological age.”143
There are numerous examples of the official recognition of Maori
spirituality. In 2002, construction on a major four-lane highway was
halted, the road eventually being re-designed, when the local Maori
sub-tribe, Ngati Naho, expressed concern that the expressway would
disturb the lair of Karu Tahi, a one-eyed taniwha (spiritual guardian
or monster).144 When AgResearch, a Crown agricultural research
facility, sought to develop a genetically modified class of Fresian cow
that would produce milk containing the basic human myelin protein,
local Maori, amongst others, vigorously objected.145 The sub-tribe,
Ngati Wairere, claimed that alteration of whakapapa (genealogy) of
humankind by mixing the genetic makeup of humans with other
species would be deeply offensive and contrary to tikanga Maori
(Maori custom).146 The Maori believed that both whakapapa
(genealogy) and mauri (roughly, the life-force possessed by all
things) were intangible taonga (treasures) deserving of active
protection in terms of the relevant legislation and the Treaty of
Waitangi. A further example of state recognition of Maori
spirituality, even in the face of public criticism, occurred in 2001
when information surfaced that the Foreign Affairs and Trade
Ministry funded the travel of kaumatua (elders) to overseas
embassies to perform hikitapu, or spiritual cleansing ceremonies.147
Aside from these controversy-generating instances, the
recognition of Maori spiritual concerns is becoming a fairly

142. Erich Kolig, Of Condoms, Biculturalism and Political Correctness: The Maori
Renaissance and Cultural Politics in New Zealand, 46 PAIDEUMA 231, 246 (2000).
143. Jane Clifton, Beyond Belief, N.Z. LISTENER, Oct. 7, 2000, at 24.
144. See Taniwha Halts Work on Highway, N.Z. HERALD, Nov. 8, 2002; Transit May
Have To Narrow New Expressway To Avoid Taniwha, OTAGO DAILY TIMES, Nov. 9, 2002, at
A11. The matter was settled when Transit agreed to re-design the road embankment at a cost
of $15,000 to $20,000. Deal Settles Row over Taniwha’s Lair, OTAGO DAILY TIMES, Jan. 10,
2003, at 19.
145. See Bleakley v. Envtl. Risk Mgmt. Auth., [2001] 3 N.Z.L.R. 213 (H.C.).
146. See id.
147. C. Langdon, Five Nights in Bangkok To Lift Tapu, DOMINION, July 13, 2001, at 1;
MP Against Tax-Funded Cleansing, OTAGO DAILY TIMES, July 14, 2001, at 3. See
RISHWORTH ET AL., supra note 85, at 304.
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unobtrusive and commonplace thing.148 For example, the use of
karakia (prayers) to commence court proceedings149 or public
meetings150 is increasingly permitted, and sacred sites (waahi tapu)
are acknowledged and protected under environmental legislation.151
The Ngai Tahu Claims Settlement Act of 1998152 contains extensive
statutory acknowledgement of the mythological and sacred origins of
natural landmarks, such as Aoraki (Mount Cook), and of Ngai
Tahu’s special cultural and spiritual association with them.153 One
recent example is illustrative.
There was an urgent need for a prison in Northland, and in 1999
the Government selected Ngawha, a rural location, as the site. The
Northland Regional Council, however, declined to grant the
necessary resource consents under the Resource Management Act of
1991 (RMA).154 On April 3, 2001, the Minister of Corrections
appealed the Council’s refusal to the Environment Court. The
Council’s refusal of the consents was solely due to the harmful effects
the installation would have on the cultural, spiritual, and other
interests of certain local Maori.155

148. Such recognition is now commonplace, but was rare, if not positively eschewed,
twenty years ago. See David Williams, Purely Metaphysical Concerns, in WHENUA: MANAGING
OUR RESOURCES 289–321 (Mereta Kawharu ed., 2002); RISHWORTH ET AL., supra note 85,
at 306–07.
149. See Friends & Cmty. of Ngawha, Inc. v. Minister of Corr., 2002 N.Z.R.M.A. LEXIS
37 (C.A). Justice Wild “appreciated” the karakia offered on each morning of the hearing,
although he did chide that the next time the judge’s permission be sought beforehand. Id. For
more on karakia, see Mair v. Wanganui Dist. Court, [1996] 1 N.Z.L.R. 556 (H.C.).
150. The Complaints Review Tribunal struck out an action by a member of the public
objecting to a karakia delivered at a public meeting to hear public submissions on wastewater
consent applications. Church v. Hawkes Bay Reg’l Council, Complaints Review Tribunal, CRT
04/01, Mar. 26, 2001; see also RISHWORTH ET AL., supra note 85, at 288.
151. See, e.g., TV3 Network Servs. Ltd. v. Waikato Dist. Council, [1998] 1 N.Z.L.R. 360
(H.C.).
152. 1998 S.N.Z. No. 97.
153. Id. Schedule 14 of the Ngai Tahu Claims Settlement Act 1998 contains an extensive
narrative of the origins of New Zealand according to Maori cosmology (viz., the union of Raki
(Sky Father) and Papatuanuku (Earth Mother)). Id. As for Aoraki, it “represents the most
sacred of ancestors, from whom Ngai Tahu descend . . . the ancestor embodied in the
mountain remains the physical manifestation of Aoraki [one of the four sons of Raki], the link
between the supernatural and the natural world.” Id. For further discussion, see John Dawson,
A Constitutional Property Settlement Between Ngai Tahu and the New Zealand Crown, in
PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 207–23 (Janet McLean ed., 1999).
154. 1991 No. 69.
155. Beadle v. Minister of Corr., A 74/02, ¶¶ 7–8 (Env’t Ct. 2002). For a
comprehensive analysis of this case, see I.H. Williams, The Minister’s Prison and the Cultural
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Following a lengthy twenty-one-day hearing, the Environment
Court delivered a two-hundred-page decision upholding the original
decision to designate the site for a prison and granting the resource
consents needed by the Government.156 Unlike the Council, the
Court did not find that Maori cultural, spiritual, or health interests
would be adversely affected, though not because those concerns
were insignificant. The RMA expressly mentions Maori concerns in
its purpose provisions:
6. Matters of national importance —
In achieving the purpose of this Act, all persons exercising
functions and powers under it . . . shall recognise and provide for
the following matters of national importance;
...
(e) the relationship of Maori and their culture and traditions
with their ancestral lands, water, sites, waahi tapu [sacred
sites], and other taonga [treasures].
7. Other matters—
In achieving the purpose of this Act, all persons exercising
functions and powers under it . . . shall have particular regard to —
(a) Kaitiakitanga [Kaitiakitanga is the exercise of
guardianship by the tangata whenua (first people of the land)
of an area in accordance with tikanga Maori (Maori custom) in
relation to natural and physical resources; and includes the
ethic of stewardship].
8. Treaty of Waitangi—
In achieving the purpose of this Act, all persons exercising
functions and powers under it . . . shall take into account the
principles of the Treaty of Waitangi (Te Tiriti o Waitangi).157

Of the various concerns raised by the Maori opponents to the
prison—and not all Maori were against the proposal—the most

Prison: Lessons from the Northland Prison Litigation, 20 N.Z. U. L. REV. 320 (2003).
156. Beadle, A 74/02, ¶¶ 7–8.
157. Resource Management Act of 1991, 1991 S.N.Z. No. 69, pt. 2, § 5.
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fascinating contention was that the prison would interfere with the
relationship of the tangata whenua (first people of the land) with a
taniwha (spiritual guardian or monster) named Tukauere, the
spiritual guardian of this area. The opponents claimed that
Takauere’s domain encompassed the prison site at Ngawha and that
the installation would interfere with his pathways to the surface and
his mana (authority or prestige).158
Several pages of the Environment Court decision were devoted
to summarizing the evidence about this taniwha.159 Of the ten who
testified, three saw the development adversely affecting Takauere. He
was not some sort of mere “mascot” in the Pakeha (European)
sense, said Mr. Ron Wihongi, a local Maori tribal elder opposed to
the prison’s construction, and the proposed construction would
hinder his free movement and “literally throw mud in his eyes.”160
On the other hand, seven other witnesses denied that the installation
would have any effect on the taniwha. Mr. Wallace Wihongi,
another local Maori resident, doubted its ana (lair) embraced
Ngawha, and, even if it did, the taniwha was adaptable and “would
simply find other passageways and other places to reside. The prison
and the taniwha can co-exist.”161 Another witness suggested that
Takauere “was being misused to fight a prison” in a way that he
found offensive.162 Anglican bishop Waiohau (Ben) Te Haara, the
senior spokesman for the Ngati Rangi hapu (sub-tribe) and one of
the kaitiaki (guardians) of the Tuwhakino block, which included the
prison site, concurred that the protesting Maori’s concerns with
Takauere were pretextual.163
158.
413.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

This was the submission of counsel for the Regional Council. Beadle, A 74/02, ¶

See id. at 83–86, ¶¶ 415–35.
Id. ¶¶ 416, 419.
Id. ¶¶ 431–32.
Id. ¶ 427 (evidence of Mr. Reuben Clarke).
Bishop Te Haara’s testimony was recounted as follows:
Bishop Te Haara gave his understanding that the taniwha was a term used by
tohunga [traditional healers or priests] to determine the appropriateness or
inappropriateness of certain action that must be taken by a tribe whenever there was
a disaster or mishap that was about to occur within the tribe. A taniwha was
regarded as a manifestation of an unnatural occurrence. Taniwha were used to
support the decision-making of a tohunga.
In commenting on evidence by Dr. Hohepa, the Bishop said that in the old
days the taniwha was used to explain the inexplicable. If bad things occurred then it
might be attributed to the taniwha being offended, so people considered it
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The Court accepted that there were those who sincerely believed
in the existence of the taniwha, Takauere, which it described for
present purposes as “a mythical, spiritual, symbolic and metaphysical
being.”164 The Court respected such sincere spiritual beliefs and
noted that Parliament enjoined it to do so by virtue of sections 13
and 15 of the NZBORA.165 It emphasized that nothing in its ruling
ought to be taken as “belittling” the believers in the taniwha or “the
importance that their belief in Takauere has for them.”166 However,
there were limits in terms of both policy and practical decisionmaking. The court observed,
Even so, the Act and the Court are creations of the Parliament of a
secular State. The enabling purpose of the Resource Management
Act is for the well-being of people and communities, and does not
extend to protecting the domains of taniwha, or other mythical,
spiritual, symbolic or metaphysical beings. . . . Neither the statutory
purpose, nor the texts of [the Act], indicates that those making
decisions under the Act are to be influenced by claimed
interference with pathways of mythical, spiritual, symbolic or
metaphysical beings, or effects on their mythical, spiritual, symbolic
or metaphysical qualities.167

Practically speaking, the Court admitted to difficulties in evaluating
questions about such metaphysical matters. In the wake of
conflicting evidence about the taniwha, it had no reliable or
objective way to resolve the dispute. For instance, “the taniwha’s
pathways are not physical passages that can be measured and (at least
on some accounts) the dimensions of the taniwha range from time to
time.”168 Furthermore, the tribunal had to be persuaded on the facts

important not to offend the taniwha. Bishop Te Haara did not accept that the
taniwha is guardian of the geothermal resource, asserting that it is the hapu of
Ngawha who are the kaitaiki.
The Bishop testified that his elders never mentioned Takauere to him, and that
it is not one of their taonga. He gave the opinion that the concept was being used
by people for their own purposes. Bishop Te Haara gave the opinion that using the
site for caring for those who have needs and helping to heal them would not offend
the taniwha if there is such a manifestation in one’s mind.
Id. ¶¶ 423–25.
164. Id. ¶ 436.
165. Id. ¶ 437.
166. Id. ¶ 442.
167. Id. ¶ 439.
168. Id. ¶ 440.
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that the being existed and would be impinged upon. In light of the
evidence presented, the tribunal concluded that
[n]one of us has been persuaded . . . that, to whatever extent
Takauere may exist as a mythical, spiritual, symbolic or
metaphysical being, it would be affected in pathways to the surface
or in any way at all by the proposed prison, or any earthworks,
streamworks, or other works or development for the prison.169

In terms of section 6(e), the Court found insufficient evidence that
Ngawha was a place of any great ancestral or spiritual significance.
For example, there were no waahi tapu (sacred sites) on the prison
site, and the building of a prison would not offend the relationship
of local Maori with the waters of Lake Tuwhakino.170 Despite this
holding, however, it is noteworthy for the purposes of this discussion
that the court did seriously evaluate the protesting Maori’s
argument. Similar objections by other non-Maori citizens based
upon their cultural or religious beliefs would not have been accorded
the same detailed consideration.
The prison case illustrates a clear state acknowledgement of
Maori religion, but state recognition of Maori religious concerns has
not gone unchallenged. Some have argued that the recognition
unfairly privileges one religion over another171 or, worse still, that it
simply enables the cynical exploitation of traditional religious beliefs
for “pecuniary gain” by some Maori.172 For secular liberals,
rationalists, and skeptics in the Enlightenment tradition, it represents
a regrettable reintroduction of religion “through the back door.”173
2. Accommodation of Islamic traditions
Maori spirituality has not been the only non-Christian religious
sect recognized by the New Zealand government. Courts have also
generally recognized that suitable accommodation of a person’s
religious beliefs may be required in those circumstances where the

169. Id. ¶ 439.
170. See id. ¶¶ 447–86.
171. See David Round, Here Be Dragons, 11 OTAGO L. REV. 31, 31–33 (2005).
172. Id. at 35.
173. See Erich Kolig, Coming Through the Backdoor? Secularization in New Zealand and
Maori Religiosity, in THE FUTURE OF CHRISTIANITY: HISTORICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL,
POLITICAL AND THEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES FROM NEW ZEALAND 183 (John Stenhouse et
al. eds., 2004).
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general law unintentionally yet significantly burdens a believer’s
religious practice. A statutory example is section 28(3) of the Human
Rights Act of 1993. An employer must accommodate the religious
or ethical belief practices of an employee as long as any adjustment
required “does not unreasonably disrupt the employer’s activities.”174
The most interesting recent case testing the boundaries of the need
to accommodate religious claimants also generated public
controversy about the nation’s commitment to and the boundaries
of multiculturalism.
In Police v. Razamjoo,175 the key issue was whether two female
Muslim witnesses would be permitted to wear their burqas—fulllength, loose-fitting garments covering the body and head save for a
narrow slit for the eyes—while giving their testimony in court.176
Fouzya Salim and Feraiba Razamjoo were Crown witnesses in a case
against the latter’s brother.177 Abdul Razamjoo was charged with
making a false statement to police as part of an insurance fraud.178
He reported that his car had been stolen, lodged a claim with his
insurance company, and was paid out by the company.179 Meanwhile,
he had deposited the vehicle at the address of a Mr. Salim—another
member of the local Afghani community in Auckland—where the
two would supposedly remove identifying features and sell the car.180
Later, the vehicle was located and, when questioned, Mr. Razamjoo
denied he had made a false insurance claim.181 He alleged that Mr.
Salim had stolen the vehicle from him.182 Mr. Salim’s wife Fouzya
and the defendant’s sister, Feraiba Razamjoo (who was living with
the Salims at the relevant time) were called by the Crown to confirm
aspects of Mr. Salim’s account of the events.183
The District Court noted that “there could be a considerable
significance attaching to the credibility and reliability of the two

174. Human Rights Act 1993, § 28(3).
175. [2005] D.C.R. 408 (D.C.). For a detailed analysis, see David Griffiths, Pluralism
and the Law: New Zealand Accommodates the Burqa, 11 OTAGO L. REV. 281 (2006).
176. See Razamjoo, ¶ 1.
177. Id. ¶ 11.
178. Id. ¶ 10.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
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witnesses who wished to give evidence whilst wearing their
burqas.”184 Defense counsel protested vigorously that to permit these
two witnesses to testify veiled would seriously compromise the
defendant’s right to a fair trial under section 25(a)185 of the
NZBORA.186 The ability to observe the demeanor of the witnesses
would be impaired,187 as would the opportunity to undertake an
effective cross-examination.188 On the other hand, the two women
were adamant that to unveil themselves in public would be a grave
infringement of their religious beliefs.189
The Court heard extensive evidence on whether the wearing of
the burqa (and other veils) was a religious requirement or simply a
cultural one. Judge Lindsay Moore commented wistfully that the
court “may well have been considerably assisted by evidence from a
cleric or elder”190 on Islamic attire (and any adjustments that might
conform with the faith), but such expertise was not provided. On
behalf of the prosecution, Professor Paul Morris, professor of
religious studies at Victoria University, gave detailed testimony of
the Islamic teaching on the topic. He explained that “[i]n
Afghanistan, the practice of wearing the burqa is near universal and
understood to be authorized by the traditions and texts above
[namely the Qur’an and Hadith].”191 The defense countered that
the practice was simply a benighted cultural imposition.192 Judge
Moore refused to be drawn into a distinction that “is [so] hotly
debated within the Muslim world community.”193 He explained
further,
The interrelationship between religious beliefs and cultural
practices is inevitably complex. . . . What started as cultural
practices may become matters of religious belief, conversely
184. Id. ¶ 12.
185. This section deals with criminal procedure. For further discussion of this section, see
RISHWORTH ET AL., supra note 85, at 663–742.
186. See Razamjoo, ¶ 42.
187. Id. ¶ 79.
188. Id. ¶ 80.
189. See id. ¶ 13.
190. Id. ¶ 20.
191. Id. ¶ 16.
192. See id. ¶ 57.
193. Erich Kolig, Muslim Traditions and Islamic Law in New Zealand: The ‘Burqa Case’
and the Challenge of Multiculturalism (forthcoming 2006) (manuscript at 4, on file with
author).
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religious beliefs can result in the generation of new cultural
practices or substantial changes to existing ones. . . . The original
justifications for, and “validity” of, particular beliefs and customs
. . . are subjects for disputation—scholarly and otherwise—but they
are generally not amenable to judicial determination.194

The question for Judge Moore was not whether wearing the
burqa was essential or a religious requirement but whether the
claimant herself sincerely believed the practice to be required by her
faith.195 Here, Mrs. Salim had told the court that she would rather
kill herself than reveal her face while giving evidence.196 Her
unveiling on an earlier occasion for the purpose of being
photographed for her driving license was noted197 but did not
undercut the sincerity of her claim in the present situation. Judge
Moore concluded,
This Court cannot be drawn into attempting to determine the
theological or other “validity” of the practice of wearing the burqa.
The evidence of Professor Morris establishes that in the culture
from which Mrs. Salim comes, the practice of wearing the burqa is
widespread. It is seen as a public declaration of faith. This Court
accepts the evidence of Mrs Salim’s faith and beliefs. It accepts that
to require her to remove her burqa in public (dire emergencies or
other very compelling reasons excepted) would be to shame and
disgrace her both in her own eyes and in those of the community
of like believers whose customs and beliefs she is proud to
uphold.198

Judge Moore noted that the present case was one of first
impression in New Zealand.199 Overseas jurisprudence was
considered, such as a United States decision where a Florida state
court had held there was a compelling state interest in requiring a

194. Razamjoo, ¶ 65.
195. On the question of not weighing the validity of religious beliefs but only the
sincerity with which they are held, the District Court quoted from a Maryland Court of
Appeals judgment, McMillan v. Maryland, 265 A.2d 453 (Md. 1970).
196. This was repeated in two newspaper reports: Court Says Women Must Lift Veil when
Giving Evidence, N.Z. HERALD, Jan. 17, 2005; Monique Devereux, Religious Leaders Say
Wearing Veil Is a Personal Choice, N.Z. HERALD, Oct. 30, 2004. Curiously, this claim was not
recorded in the written court judgment.
197. Razamjoo, ¶ 21.
198. Id. ¶ 67.
199. See id. ¶ 86.
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Muslim female to remove her burqa for a driver’s license
photograph.200
The Court emphasized that more than just the rights of the
witnesses and the defendant were at issue here. Besides Mr.
Razamjoo’s legitimate expectation of a fair trial and two Muslim
witnesses’ right to manifest their religious beliefs, the public had
rights and expectations to an open and public criminal justice
system.201
The Judge had earlier remarked that neither side had explored
the possibility of an intermediate solution “between the giving of
evidence whilst veiled” and testimony “in open Court in the ordinary
way with the face uncovered.”202 The Court concluded that both
these alternatives were untenable and that it would be “contrary to
the interests of justice”203 to require the witnesses to have their faces
exposed in court. It similarly concluded that to allow testimony to be
given “from beneath what is effectively a hood or mask” represented
“such a major departure from accepted practice and the values of a
free and democratic society as to seriously risk bringing the Court
into dispute.”204 Judge Moore, however, devised an elegant
compromise.205 The two witnesses would be allowed to give their
evidence from behind screens so that only the judge, counsel, and
female court staff would be able to see the witnesses’ faces.206 In
addition, provided the witness’s face was fully exposed to view, the
witness could wear a hat or scarf to cover her hair.207 The trial duly
proceeded, and Mr. Razamjoo was later convicted.208
The results of the Razamjoo case fueled some heated public
debate. The response from local Muslim leaders was mixed, with
some denying that the wearing of the burqa in the court setting was
a religious duty, and with others urging for a compromise to be

200. See id. ¶ 89 (discussing Freeman v. State, No. 2002-CA-2828, 2003 WL 21338619
(Fla. Cir. Ct. 2003)).
201. Id. ¶ 107.
202. Id. ¶ 20.
203. Id. ¶ 108.
204. Id. ¶ 109.
205. One commentator described it as “Solomonic.” Paul Rishworth, Human Rights,
N.Z. L. REV. 87, 107 (2005).
206. Razamjoo, ¶ 110.
207. Id. ¶ 112.
208. Man at Centre of Burqa Court Case Convicted, N.Z. HERALD, Mar. 24, 2005.
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struck.209 The most forthright criticism came from non-Muslims.
The Otago Daily Times believed the judge had gone too far in the
name of “cultural sensitivity.”210 Winston Peters, the leader of the
New Zealand First Party, railed, “People who come here from
countries with extreme religious views and customs should seriously
think about resettling where practices of covering up faces are the
norm.”211
Indeed, the scene had been set in the trial itself. Defense counsel
submitted copious material—almost entirely printed off the
internet—on the evils of Islamic fundamentalism. To permit the
wearing of the burqa in New Zealand courts, counsel urged, “must
be seen in the context of the political expression of the Muslim
religion or Islamism which aims to relegate the Western world back
to the dark ages through bombings of innocent people, televised
executions and general dehumanisation of women.”212 The Court
castigated this material as “political rather than legal in nature” and
dependent “upon factual assertions for which there was no evidential
foundation.”213 The defense submissions were “extravagant and
often needlessly offensive in both scope and expression. There were
numerous appeals to ignorance and prejudice.”214
A recurring concern in the public controversy was the very idea
of special allowances or exceptions for other religions and cultures.
“When in Rome, do as the Romans do” was the popular sentiment.
At trial, defense counsel had urged that any ruling accommodating
the witnesses should be viewed as a most dangerous precedent with
“the potential to infiltrate New Zealand’s legal system by creating a
separate justice system for Muslims in what is essentially a secular
society.”215 By coming to New Zealand, the two Islamic witnesses
had tacitly agreed to obey New Zealand laws and so they ought not
“now demand special laws for themselves.”216 One recalls here the
209. Devereux, supra note 196.
210. Blinded by Burqa, OTAGO DAILY TIMES, Jan. 20, 2005.
211. Helem Tunnah, Muslim MP Says Burqa Is Cultural Not Religious, N.Z. HERALD,
October 29, 2004. Following the 2005 General Election, Winston Peters was, amidst some
surprise and criticism (given his history of public utterances about the dangers of increasing
Asian immigration), appointed as Minister of Foreign Affairs.
212. Razamjoo, ¶ 53.
213. Id. ¶ 55.
214. Id. ¶ 73.
215. Id. ¶ 54.
216. Id. ¶ 56.
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similar American concern expressed in a nineteenth-century
polygamy decision where the United States Supreme Court rejected
a religious-based exemption from the general law lest this in effect
“permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.”217
The New Zealand courts have not, however, adopted this
sanguine, unbending view. Indeed, the aftermath of the Razamjoo
case has by no means been negative. Policy-makers, well aware of the
issues raised by the case, responded in the form of a proposed
statutory effort at accommodation.218 The Evidence Bill of 2005
provides that a judge may permit a witness to give evidence “in an
alternative way” on the grounds of “the linguistic or cultural
background or religious beliefs of the witness.”219
Consideration of both Maori and Islamic spiritual ideals has been
a powerful counter-thrust to the gradual erosion of New Zealand’s
de facto Christian establishment. These dynamic relations certainly
promise more change in the future.
IV. THE FUTURE OF RELIGION-STATE RELATIONS
IN NEW ZEALAND
The continually changing dynamic of church-state relations in
New Zealand makes any long-term forecast of that relationship very
difficult. As mentioned earlier, New Zealand, for the most part, has
not witnessed the large-scale and bitter religious turmoil that has
beset many nations. Professor Anthony Wood contends that “a
major factor” in the tolerance exhibited, albeit imperfectly, to nonChristian faiths in the nation’s history has been “the overwhelming,
unchallenged Christian composition of the population.”220 If this is
correct, then the diminution of this cultural and religious
homogeneity will surely test the track record of tolerance to date.
The religious composition of twenty-first century New Zealand is
more heterogeneous than a century ago. The latest census shows
that Christianity is still the largest religion with some sixty-one
217. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1879). This fear of “courting
anarchy” was reiterated by the majority of the Supreme Court in Employment Div. v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990).
218. Legal Advice: Consistency with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990: Evidence
Bill, ¶ 79 (Ministry of Justice Apr. 5, 2005), http://www.justice.govt.nz/bill-of-rights/billlist-2005/e-bill/evidence-bill.html.
219. Cls. 99(1), (3)(e).
220. Wood, supra note 5, at 214.
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percent of the population identifying with that faith.221 NonChristian faiths are becoming more established although their
numbers remain quite small. The leading non-Christian religions are
Buddhism (1.2 percent), Hinduism (1.1 percent) and Islam (0.7
percent), but all three are dwarfed by the fastest growing category
composed of those who responded they had “no religion” (nearly 30
percent).222
With this trend towards a more heterogeneous society, New
Zealand can expect more religious freedom claims from Muslim,
Hindu, and other minority religious and cultural communities, as
well as from secularists, rationalists, and atheists who insist that
freedom from religion be equally respected. The emerging case law
combined with a climate of respect for human rights and the legal
machinery to give effect to them gives rise to a cautious optimism
that much will be done to accommodate religious difference.
There are, however, necessarily limits to religious tolerance. New
Zealand, as with other liberal democracies, will not accept all
customs, practices, or rituals presented. It has, for instance, rejected
the practice of female circumcision.223 Yet, there are surely many
areas of conduct where a suitable compromise can be struck.
Compromise will be increasingly important in New Zealand as
different ethnicities and cultures continue to become more
established. Government immigration and migrant resettlement
policies have gradually abandoned the longstanding policy of
assimilation, and, while New Zealand has not adopted
multiculturalism as its official policy, it is careful to promote ethnic
and cultural diversity.224 For instance, in 2001 the Government
established the Office for Ethnic Affairs. Chris Carter, the Minister
for Ethnic Affairs, stated that it was “important that the
Government, and all its departments, endeavour to talk to ethnic

221. See NEW ZEALAND OFFICIAL YEARBOOK 2004, at 98 (showing statistics from the
2001 census).
222. Id. The actual numbers are: Buddhists, 41,634; Hindu, 39,798; Muslim, 23,631;
and no religion, 1,028,052. The total population in 2001 was 3,468,813. Id.
223. See Crimes Act 1961, No. 43, § 204A. The ban on female genital mutilation was
introduced in 1994. See Elisabeth McDonald, Circumcision and the Criminal Law: The
Challenge for a Multicultural Society, 21 N.Z.U. L. REV. 233 (2004).
224. See, e.g., MICHAEL FLETCHER, DEPARTMENT OF LABOUR, MIGRANT SETTLEMENT:
A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE AND ITS RELEVANCE TO NEW ZEALAND 16 (Sept. 1999),
available at http://www.dol.govt.nz/publication-view.asp?ID=47.
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people, to listen to their needs, and to incorporate an ethnic
perspective into the formation of policy.”225
The secularity of public life remains a live issue. There is a
constituency that would potentially favor a “naked public square,”
given that nearly a third of New Zealanders indicate they have no
religion. Perhaps the state’s belated adoption of Maori ritual is the
beginning of a civil religion with a strong indigenous flavor.226 The
question of whether New Zealand has ever had a significant “civil
religion” is one that has exercised many sociologists and historians.227
The recent recognition of Maori spiritual concerns in state
ceremonies and in environmental and other laws may be a harbinger
for the inclusion and recognition of further religious values and
rituals. Or, it may be that Maori spirituality remains as an exception
justified on historic, bicultural grounds. As the twenty-first century
unfolds, the answers to these and other thorny questions will
hopefully become clearer.

225. Office of Ethnic Affairs, Ethnic Perspectives in Policy: A Resource 4 (2002),
available at http://www.ethnicaffairs.govt.nz (accessed November 16, 2005).
226. See Peter Donovan, Civic Responsibilities of the Churches to People of Other Faiths, in
GOD AND GOVERNMENT: THE NEW ZEALAND EXPERIENCE 81–82 (Rex Ahdar & John
Stenhouse eds., 2000); Richard V. Pierard, “In God We Trust . . . All Others Pay Cash”:
Reflections on Civil Religion, 10 STIMULUS 11, 18 (2002).
227. See, e.g., Michael Hill & Wiebe Zwaga, Civil and Civic: Engineering a National
Religious Consensus, 2 N.Z. SOC. 27 (1987) (arguing that the plausibility of civil religion in
New Zealand is highly questionable).
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